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Abstract
This paper sets out a simple spatial model of energy exploitation to ask how the lo-
cation and productivity of energy resources affects the distribution of economic activity
across geographic space. By combining elements from energy economics and economic
geography we link the productivity of energy resources to the incentives for economic
activity to agglomerate. We find a novel scaling law links the productivity of energy
resources to population sizes, while rivers and roads effectively magnify productivity.
We show how our theory’s predictions concerning a single core, aggregate to predictions
over regional landscapes and city size distributions at the country level.
∗We are very grateful to seminar participants in several countries, and for the hospitality of the Energy
Institute at Haas, University of California Berkeley and the Henri Poincare Institute in Paris, France where a
portion of this work was conducted. We would like to thank, without implicating, Bob Allen, Jared Carbone,
Jevan Cherniwchan, Oded Galor, Gene Grossman, David Laband, Arvind Magesan, Ken McKenzie, and Jim
Wilen for comments on earlier drafts or portions of this work. Excellent research assistance was provided by
Nolan Derby, Fruzsina Mayer, and Rui Wan. The usual disclaimer applies.
†Assistant Professor, School of Economics, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, Georgia. Moreno-
Cruz was supported through National Science Foundation Grant no. 1510510
‡Professor of Economics and Canada Research Chair, Department of Economics, University of Calgary,
Canada; Research Associate at the NBER; Fellow of the Beijer Institute of Ecological Economics; CESifo
Associate and a research professor at the Ifo Institute, Germany.
1
1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to ask how the location and “spatial productivity” of energy
resources affect the distribution of economic activity across the globe. This is a large, and as
yet unanswered, research question that cannot be resolved by any one paper. Instead, we take
one small, but important, step towards answering it by developing a bare bones theoretical
framework to define energy’s (spatial) productivity precisely; to show how differences across
energy resources in their productivity have large effects on supplies; and to demonstrate how
even small variation in the productivity of energy resources across landscapes can create very
densely populated agglomerations of widely different sizes surrounded by large areas with
dispersed production and low population density.
Even a momentary glance at the world today should give pause to any reader looking for
a simple connection between today’s centers of economic activity and the location of today’s
most important energy resources. The distribution of economic activity we observe today
surely reflects a complex mix of forces. Cheap energy sources in the distant past may have
produced permanent centers of economic activity that today are very distant from current
energy supplies. Since the world economy has employed many different energy sources over
many centuries, any serious empirical examination needs to account for the many other
forces governing the location of economic activity. Three recent studies, however, have done
exactly that and found strong links between the existence of spatially productive resources,
population growth, and urbanization.
Nunn and Qian (2011) provides empirical evidence linking the introduction of the potato
from the New World to the Old, to higher population levels and urbanization rates in the
Old World. Their baseline estimates suggest the introduction of the potato, which is almost
three times more spatially productive than typical staple crops, is responsible for 26% of the
increase in Old World populations from 1700 to 1900. Similarly, Fernihough and O’Rourke
(2014) study the introduction of coal using technology (primarily steam and smelting inno-
vations) and link these introductions to changes in European city populations during the
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Industrial Revolution.1 They find the ability to use coal (in these uses) was responsible for
over 60% of the growth in European city populations from 1750 and 1900. Moving to a
contemporary setting, Severnini (2013) examines the impact of hydroelectric dam building
on local communities throughout the U.S from 1920 to 1980 and finds the impact of dams
on county population growth is considerable and long lasting. We take these studies, and
others, as motivation for a theoretical analysis of how variation in energy constraints across
space affects the geography of economic activity.2
The modeling choices we make are informed by four observations. The first is that energy
is not physically scarce. Many sources of energy available today — solar, wind, coal and
non-conventional oil and gas — represent vast, almost limitless, potential supplies. The
economic costs of exploiting them however limit their use. The second is that exploiting far
flung energy resources and moving energy to markets is primarily what the energy industry
does. Third is a recognition that one of the most important attributes of an energy resource
is its ability to deliver substantial power relative to its weight or other physical dimensions.
And fourth, that energy — above all other productive factors — has a strong claim to being
an essential input to human activity, production, and growth.
To investigate the potential implications of these observations for the distribution of
economic activity across space, we proceed in two steps. First, we build a very simple spatial
model. It features real geographic space, a fixed core that occupies no space, and energy
resources that are drawn from a surrounding two dimensional plane. These assumptions
eliminate any role for physical scarcity by assuming energy resources are limitless, but still
costly to exploit. And since energy resources are located in geographic space, the availability
of energy resources at any given location reflects spatial productivity and transport costs.
We measure spatial productivity of an energy resource by its power density. The power
1Moreno-Cruz and Taylor (2012) argue that the shift in England from biomass based fuels to coal in the
latter part of the sixteenth century was at least partially responsible for the radical shift in the population
distribution across the country.
2Economic historians have long drawn a link between the characteristics of energy resources and economic
outcomes. See for example Allen (2009), Wrigley (2010), Smil (2008), Fouquet and Pearson (1998) and de
Zeeuw (1978).
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density of an energy resource represents its ability to provide a flow of power taking into
account the area needed for its exploitation. To model transport costs we go back to the
fundamentals of work, force, power and resistance to understand at a very basic level how
physical differences across energy resources affect their transport costs. The benefit of this
return to fundamentals is that transport costs are grounded in physical laws.
Putting our assumptions together generates our Only Energy Model where the location
and productivity of available energy resources determines energy supplies at our core. We
show how energy supply adjusts along both intensive and extensive margins and together
these produce a scaling law linking energy supplies delivered to the core with the cube of
energy’s spatial productivity. We also show how variation in transport costs, introduced
perhaps by rivers, roads or transmission lines, effectively magnify the spatial productivity
of nearby energy resources leaving our scaling law intact. Our second step is to study the
economic motives behind agglomeration. To do so we embed the Only Energy Model in a
general equilibrium setting where agents surrounding a single potential core choose to either
agglomerate or remain dispersed in the hinterland. We create an incentive for agglomeration
via conventional channels, but find several non-conventional results.
First we show how a location’s “comparative advantage” (measured by the ratio of spatial
productivity to transport costs) dictates whether we will see agglomeration or not; whereas a
location’s absolute advantage (measured by spatial productivity alone) determines how rich
or populous a city may become. Minimum city size is independent of how energy rich a region
may be, and low transport costs or high productivity alone do not guarantee agglomeration.
Second, we show how economic activity agglomerates in places where favorable geography
alone magnifies existing, and perhaps even relatively poor, resource potential because of its
low cost or abundant transportation options. Third, by adding up over uniform geographic
spaces (landscapes), we show how our theory generates additional predictions for regional
population densities and city numbers. These results at the regional level echo our scaling
law but in surprising ways. For example, regional populations respond proportionately to
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differences in spatial productivity whereas core sizes within regions scale with the cube of
spatial productivity. Finally, we combine many such landscapes or regions into a hypothetical
country and show how our theory’s scaling law and agglomeration decision transforms any
symmetric distribution of comparative advantage over geographic space into a distribution
of city sizes that is both truncated with no small cities and features a long right tail with few
very large cities. The exact distribution follows from the interplay of nature’s distribution
of comparative advantage across geographic space and our model’s generated scaling law
relationships.
Therefore, despite its back-to-fundamentals flavor and its highly abstract presentation,
the theory can provide several sharp predictions suitable for empirical testing using new GIS
data (Nordhaus, 2006). And while increasing returns and transport costs play a role in the
model, the scaling relationship linking energy productivity to energy availability is the key
driver of most results. In this sense, we provide an energy-centric theory of agglomeration
that goes some way in providing an answer to our research question.
Our work is related to previous contributions in both energy and resource economics and
economic geography, but has also benefitted in perhaps less obvious ways from the contri-
butions of economic historians. Although the Only Energy Model is constructed from first
principles, it bears some resemblance to von Thunen’s model of an Isolated State. In contrast
to von Thunen however, transport costs and, by implication, the exploitation zone are set
by appeal to physical laws governing energy use. It also bears a family resemblance to other
spatial models of resource and energy use where resources and demand centers are treated
as points in space (Gaudet, Moreaux and Salant (2001)); where consumers (Kolstad (1994))
or resources (Laffont and Moreaux (1986)) are distributed on line segments; where resource
pools are differentiated by costs, suggestive of a spatial setting (Pindyck (1978), Swierzbin-
ski and Mendelsohn (1989), and Chakravorty, Roumasset, and Tse (1997)); and situations
where resources themselves move across space (Sanchirico and Wilen (1999)).3 It draws on
3 There is also an emerging literature in environmental and resource economics where pollution or resource
flows follow a diffusion process across space (See Brock et al. 2012, Desmet et al. 2015). While these authors
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tools developed in the economic geography literature, but is more concerned with the size
and location of economic cores than with the empirical questions of this literature (Head and
Mayer (2004)). It is also related to the vast literature in urban and regional economics on
agglomeration economies (Rosenthal and Strange (2004)) and city size distributions (Decker
et al. (2007)).
It differs from all of this work in its treatment of geographic space outside of cities, its
focus on energy as an essential input, its ability to provide an explicit link between unique
geographic features such as rivers or coastlines and their resulting impacts on economic
activity, and its ability to move from single core, to region, to country level implications. It is
of course similar in some ways as well: for example, we too rely on the gains of specialization
creating increasing returns and agglomeration, but we limit city size not by recourse to
congestion or housing costs within the city (Helpman, 1995), but by rising energy costs
created by bringing energy resources from outside.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we develop the Only Energy Model
and link features of the transportation network to energy supply. In section 3 we introduce
a simple general equilibrium market economy to study the incentives to agglomerate. Sec-
tion 4 connects our theory to empirical work by discussing its implications for population
sizes, regional densities and city size distributions. A short conclusion follows. Detailed
calculations and proofs of propositions are in the Appendix. An Online Appendix4 contains
references to data sources, some model extensions and further calculations.
2 The Only Energy Model
We develop a simple model of energy exploitation where energy is the only input of produc-
tion. Energy is freely available everywhere on a two-dimensional plane with given density,
and transporting energy in all directions has the same costs. We focus on the case of re-
take space seriously, just as we do, their contributions focus on very different questions and problems.
4Online Appendix is available at https://www.dropbox.com/s/ghjkz80xqx2vdi6/Spatial_
OnlineAppendix.pdf?dl=0.
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newables since it admits a simple steady state analysis. Non-renewables are treated in our
Online Appendix.5
2.1 The Scaling Law
We start with a definition. The area exploited in the collection of energy is related to the
power obtained measured in Watts [W ], and to the spatial productivity of the resource,
measured by its power density in Watts per meter squared [W/m2]. If the flow of energy
collected is W , and the available energy resource has power density ∆ then the area where
these resources are collected from, called the exploitation zone, EX, must equal:
EX = W/∆ (1)
where EX is measured in meters squared [m2]. We assume collection is costless, but trans-
port to the core requires the use of energy.6 For now, assume transport costs are proportional
to distance and energy collected (we will provide conditions under which this will be true
subsequently). In this case, all we need to understand is unit costs. To that end, consider
energy resources with power density ∆, and let c/∆ be the energy cost of moving one Watt
of power, from these resources, one meter. Why we use this exact specification will become
clear subsequently, but for now note that if our objective is to maximize energy deliveries to
the core, then we collect energy resources until the marginal resource collected provides no
net energy. Denote by R∗ the distance these marginal resources are from the core. At this
margin one Watt collected is now fully expended in costly transportation to the core; that
is, R∗ must satisfy:
1− c
∆
R∗ = 0 or R∗ =
∆
c
(2)
5Readers can think of the resource as literally renewable, or take its constant cost of collection as reflective
of a exceedingly abundant non-renewable resource with no current user cost. See Section B.2 in the Online
Appendix for a more formal, and conventional, treatment of non-renewables.
6Adding constant per unit collection/harvesting/extraction costs contributes little but notation to the
analysis.
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The more power dense are the energy resources, the larger is the circular exploitation
zone surrounding our core.7 For example, very power dense resources (for the moment, think
very dry timber) will be collected at great distances, while energy resources like straw or
dung will not. If energy is an essential input then the limits imposed by (2) will in turn
constrain economic activity in any core.
To find the power available for use in the core, we start by using (2) in (1) to find total
power collected is simply given by: W ∗ = ∆EX = ∆pi[R∗]2 = pi∆3/c2.
To find the power available for use in the core, we need to subtract the energy costs of
transport. This net supply of power comes from adding up, what we might call, “energy
rents.” These rents are the excess of energy collected over transport; i.e. ∆ − cr at all
distances r ≤ R∗ from the core. To add them we use a two step procedure. Along any ray
from the core, there are ∆ Watts of power every meter and transporting these resources
to the core yields a density of [∆− cr] net Watts of delivered power. The first step is to
add up these resources along our ray over all distances less than R∗. The second step is to
accumulate these quantities by sweeping across the 2pi radians of our circular exploitation
zone. By doing so we obtain net power supply to the core as the sum of all energy rents:
W S =
∫ 2pi
0
∫ R∗
0
v[∆− c · v]dvdϕ = 2pi
∫ R∗
0
v[∆− c · v]dv = pi∆
3
3c2
(3)
Since net power is a cubic in power density, renewable resources twice as power dense deliver
eight times the supply. The implication of this result is immediate: even small variations
in the natural landscape affecting the productivity of energy resources can have large im-
plications for energy supply in the core. For example, suppose the distribution of power
densities ∆ over potential locations f(∆) was uniform over [0, ∆¯]; then 50% of the total net
7Despite some similarities, our formulation and that of von Thunen are not the same. Whereas we
associate any energy resource with a finite region of exploitation tied to its power density, the geometric
transport costs of von Thunen — cleverly coined iceberg costs by Samuelson — imply an infinite exploitation
zone for any and all energy resources. Without additional assumptions the iceberg assumption of von Thunen
leads to the somewhat uncomfortable implication that we can move a barrel of oil (a cord of wood, a bale
of hay, a pound of dung, an Ampere of electricity etc.) a billion miles and still reap some energy resources
from it. See Section A in our Online Appendix for a further discussion.
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energy supplied is concentrated in 12% of all locations.8 To verify that this result reflects a
scaling law tied to our spatial setting rather than being an artifact of our circular region of
exploitation, we now construct a setting where the exploitation zone is not circular.
To proceed we assume resources at different locations have different transport costs. This
heterogeneity could arise exogenously from the nature of the resource or the terrain; but, as
we will subsequently show, it will arise endogenously when agents avail themselves of nearby
roads, rivers or transmission lines. For simplicity, we measure the location of a resource by
its direction (in radians) relative to the core. In this more general environment we can now
show:
Proposition 1 Scaling Law: If energy resources everywhere have power density ∆ but trans-
port costs vary with the direction θ so that c = c(θ), then the exploitation zone is no longer
circular and gross power collected and net power supplied remain homogenous of degree three
in ∆.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition for this result is easy to grasp. Suppose we increase the power density
of available resources, but hold the size of the exploitation zone constant; then supplied
power should rise proportionately with power density; i.e. appear with power 1 (recall the
definition in (1)). This is the impact on the intensive margin of collection, but a higher
power density implies every meter expansion of the exploitation zone garners more resources
than before. The marginal cost of collecting an extra Watt falls, and the extensive margin
moves outwards. Since area scales with the square of this now expanding extensive margin,
this expansion implies the set of exploitable energy resources rises with the square of power
density. Adding up adjustments across both the intensive and extensive margins, means
total power collected, and net power delivered, are both cubes in power density. While this
8 To see why note the probability distribution of power W is given by: FW (w) = Pr{W < w} =
Pr
{
1
3
∆3
c2 < w
}
. This implies Pr{∆ < (3c2w)1/3} = (3c2w)1/3
∆¯
. The value w50% for which 50% of the total net
energy delivered across all locations solves FW (w50%) = 0.5. Solving for w50% we obtain: w50% = (0.5
3)W¯ =
0.125W¯ where W¯ = ∆¯
3
3c2 . 50% of the net energy delivered is concentrated in 12.5% of the locations.
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logic is impeccable, it does however rely on our assumption that energy resources travel at
constant costs; and at this point it is not clear exactly why, or for what energy resources,
this should be true. We have also claimed that transport costs will vary with direction when
agents optimize across transport options but this is far from obvious. The next subsection
examine these assumptions.
2.2 Transport costs
2.2.1 Biomass, Wood, and Staple Crops
We have assumed a constant energy cost to transport resources, but said very little about
why. To understand this assumption, consider the movement of resources with physical mass
like biomass, wood, and staple crops. The energy costs of moving these resources amounts
to the work done in overcoming friction in land transportation; and since these resources
are transported continuously in steady state this work amounts to Watts of power expended
for transport. To understand why costs are constant we need to use a small amount of
high school physics. Recall work is equal to force times distance, Wk = F · x. Force is in
turn equal to mass times acceleration F = M · a. In our case, the relevant acceleration is
the normal force exerted by gravity since any mass moved horizontally must overcome the
force of gravity g as mediated by friction in transport where µ is the coefficient of friction.9
This work is done per unit time since power is a flow. And measuring time in seconds, Wk
expended in transportation is now Joules per second which represents the Watts expended
in bringing resources to the core.10
Keeping these results in mind, revisit our unit costs of transport. If the energy resource in
question has power density ∆ [Watts/m 2], then resources capable of providing one watt are
reaped from an exploitation zone with area 1/∆. If this resource — think timber or biomass
9 We are ignoring static friction encountered when the object first moves. The force that needs to be
overcome to keep an object in motion is equal to the normal force times the coefficient of friction. Since the
object is moving horizontally, the normal force is just gravity times the mass of the object. The coefficient
of friction is a pure number greater than zero; and force is measured in Newtons.
10 Expending 1 Joule of energy in 1 second means you are delivering 1 Watt of power.
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— is available in a quantity d kilograms per squared meter, then these resources must weigh
d/∆ kilograms. And moving these resources one meter while overcoming friction, requires a
flow of power of µgd/∆. Therefore, when energy resources have mass (and they incur land
transport costs) we have c = µgd which is of course constant.
It is now apparent why we have assumed transport costs are linear in distance (work is
proportionate to distance) and linear in power collected (work is proportionate to the mass
transported).
2.2.2 Solar Power, Wind Farms, and Electricity
While constant costs may be a good assumption for some renewables, many of the most
common renewable energy sources we use today - wind, solar and hydro - need to be trans-
formed into electricity before they can be used in productive ways. And it is not obvious
these resources travel at constant cost. The key observation is that line losses — that is,
the power lost in electricity transmission — operate much like our constant energy costs of
transport given by c. These line losses come from resistivity losses or what the industry
calls Joule heating. These losses are the analog of the energy spent in performing work when
transporting resources with mass. In our earlier discussion of energy resources with mass,
we implicitly assumed resources move at constant speed (there was no acceleration of the
resource, no inertial friction, and no deceleration either) which seems quite natural given
our steady state analysis. The parallel assumption here is that electric power should move
at a constant current which we denote by I and measure in Amperes. But just as physical
transport costs are linear in distance when objects move at constant speed, line losses are
linear in distance when electricity is transmitted at constant current. Therefore, we can once
again link our per unit distance transport cost, c, to fundamental determinants. Since doing
so relies on concepts less familiar to most readers (Ohm’s law, definitions of line resistance,
etc.) we leave the details to the Appendix, and simply assert c is again constant, but now
reliant on the current and the transmission line’s resistivity as reflected by its material, ϕ,
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and its cross sectional area, a.11 Therefore if solar or wind resources are geographically dis-
persed then their power density will determine, exactly as before, the net power that could
be delivered to the core.
2.2.3 Optimization over Geography
We have thus far assumed transportation is possible from any location and, for the most
part, equally costly. But rivers, roads, and canals have offered relatively cheap transport for
food and fuel for centuries, while power lines, pipelines, and LNG terminals are necessary
for the transport of many 21st century resources. Both of these examples present a challenge
to our theory since they suggest there are large and discrete differences in transport costs
across space which would potentially alter the optimal transportation of energy resources,
our exploitation zone, and therefore our scaling law and its implications. In this section we
demonstrate how optimal use of these networks by agents implies that costs vary by direction
producing an endogenously determined c(θ) schedule that satisfies Proposition 1.
Consider the decision problem of a potential energy supplier located on one meter square
area containing resources that generates a flow of energy equal to ∆ Watts. The supplier
can take energy directly into the core or deviate to take advantage of a road nearby. Rivers
and roads help to reduce the amount of work used in transportation, increasing the amount
of energy delivered to the core. To capture this in our analysis we allow for the unit cost of
transportation by road to differ from the unit cost of transportation by land by a fraction
ρ < 1. That is, while the cost by land is equal to c, the cost by road is ρc.12 We assume
the road is a straight line that crosses the core and expands indefinitely. The location of a
supplier relative to the core is described by two terms: r, the distance from the core and
θ the angle between the segment formed by the core and the supplier and the road. A
potential energy supplier then has to decide on the optimal route to the core, and if the trip
11 In particular, c = I2(ϕ/a). See Section B in the Appendix for further details.
12ρ < 1 can alternatively represent the benefits of transmission at higher voltage, large cables, or better
materials.
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is worthwhile to undertake. Since the calculations involved are somewhat detailed we leave
them to the Online Appendix, and just report here that optimization by agents relative to
a given road/river network implicitly defines an endogenous c(θ) schedule
c(θ) = c×

(
(1− ρ2)1/2 sin θ + ρ cos θ) θ ≤ θ¯
1 θ ≥ θ¯
(4)
Agents located far from the road (i.e. at angles θ ≥ θ¯) travel straight to the core as before,
while all other agents deviate to lower costs by making at least some of their trip by the
lower cost option. Since optimization produces the schedule c(θ) we know from Proposition
1 that even when agent’s cost minimizing path creates a far from circular exploitation zone,
our scaling law still holds and variation in the productivity of energy resources again creates
large differences in delivered energy. In addition, by comparing locations with and without
low cost transport we find an additional result we refer to as the magnification effect. Our
derivations are in the Online Appendix, but an important implication follows from calculating
net energy supply:
W S =
1
3
pi∆˜3
c2
where ∆˜ ≡ ∆(g(ρ)/pi)1/3 and (g(ρ)/pi)1/3 ≥ 1 (5)
where g(ρ) = pi + 2(tan(θ¯)− θ¯) > pi. The expression above is exactly the same form as our
earlier net supply with a slight redefinition of our power density term. Therefore, we have
proven:
Proposition 2 Magnification. Endowing our core with access to a low cost transportation
option is equivalent to endowing its surrounding region with more power dense energy re-
sources.
Proof. In text.
This result implies that as far as energy supply is concerned, having a road or river (or
transmission line) cut across the core is identical to being surrounded by more productive
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energy resources.13 A moment’s reflection will reveal that regardless of the number, and
regardless of the efficacy of additional (straight line) transportation options we introduce,
the endogenous solution for energy supply delivered to the core, will again satisfy our scaling
law. This is true, since by Proposition 1 all cost minimizing paths are just different particular
solutions for c (θ). Moreover, if we were to add additional roads through our core these
options can only reduce costs (given optimization), and the equivalence result we report in
Proposition 2 is strengthened. Every one of these additional transportation improvements
is equivalent to, in energy supply terms, an additional increase in the power density of
surrounding resources. With a small bit of work it can be shown that if we were to add any
number of identical low cost transportation options and locate them optimally, then:
Proposition 3 Energy supply to the core is an increasing and weakly concave function of
the number of transportation options serving it.
Proof. See Appendix.
One interpretation of this result is that locations blessed with many transport options
look like they are endowed with very power dense energy resources. Another more speculative
interpretation is that such a location would support a large agglomeration of economic activ-
ity. To make this connection precise we now incorporate the supply side of the Only Energy
Model into a simple general equilibrium model where agents choose whether to agglomerate
in a central core or remain dispersed and rely on home production.
3 A Simple Energy Based Model of Agglomeration
We start with a featureless plain containing energy resources with spatial productivity ∆
[W/m2]. There is a uniform density of agents across this space, and it proves useful to
13 When traveling with the current a river’s cost is also ρc but against it c/ρ. By this assumption, river
transport is only useful when you are an energy producer upstream; whereas road transport reduces frictions
in two directions and not one. Thus, we need to modify the gains function: griver(ρ) =
pi
2 +
g(ρ)
2 . The
close reader will notice that the limiting case of a core serviced by many roads represents an island location;
whereas, the limiting case of a core serviced by many rivers is a coastal location for the core.
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think of each square meter of area as representing a single farm with some number, Ω, of
agents residing in it. Initially, consumption per person on each and every farm is consistent
with population being constant; therefore, population density is fixed and without loss of
generality, we set the number of residents on each farm to unity: Ω = 1. We leave for the
moment the possibility that migration or population growth may respond to the real income
gains brought about by agglomeration, but return to this issue later. These residents reap
the energy from their land and transform this into final products for consumption. We refer
to this autarkic use of energy resources as home production.
There are many final products and for tractability we assume they are symmetric sub-
stitutes. Home production of all goods is possible, but becomes less and less efficient as the
number of goods expands. It may be relatively easy for an individual to grind their own
grain, bake their own bread, and brew their own beer but once they expand the set of pro-
duced goods to include leather work, shoe manufacture, and the production of candle wax,
our jack of all trades becomes increasingly less efficient. This amounts to an assumption of
diseconomies of scope under home production.
Into this environment we introduce the potential for agents to agglomerate at a single core
labelled C. The core is located somewhere in this space, and we consider the incentives nearby
agents have to agglomerate at C. Any agent who reaps energy from nearby landholdings
but consumes and trades goods at C is said to agglomerate at C. We think of C as a
small village or town with surrounding landholdings being locally owned. The location
of C is arbitrary and fixed, but in practice this locational indeterminacy is resolved by
small geographic variations creating focal points for settlements. We focus on incentives
created by beneficial mutual exchange, but agglomeration for security, administrative, and
insurance reasons must also have been very important in earlier times.14 Historically, we
14 Major cities today grow and thrive because of the benefits of labor market pooling, knowledge spillovers
and input sharing. Their current size is restricted by rising land rents and traffic congestion and not energy
constraints per se. This however reflects the very success of our current energy system based on fossil
fuels to deliver significant power at low cost over great distances. See our later discussion on persistence in
location and Zipf’s law to see how today’s distribution of city sizes may have been shaped by earlier energy
constraints.
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find settlements at the mouth of rivers, on easy to defend plateaus, beside wind breaks, at
valley crossings, etc. Any one of these features, even if it generates only small benefits, will
make some locations for C superior to others. Propositions 2 and 3 in particular show how
such variation can create local advantages in an otherwise featureless plain.
Every agent has a choice. One option is to use the ∆ Watts of power generated on their
land to produce at home a set of goods they value in utility. We refer to this choice as the
home production option and index goods produced at home by z. Alternatively, the agent
can use their ∆ Watts of power to produce their own unique good and transport it to C to
exchange for goods produced by other agents who are likewise specialized. We refer to this
agglomerate and trade outcome as the agglomerate option.15 Since agents produce distinct
goods, we need a way to label them. A simple way to label them is to use distance from
the core to identify different goods.16 That is, good z is the good that agents at distance z
from the core are especially proficient at producing; goods z′ 6= z are those additional goods
obtained via trade in the core. It is also important to distinguish between labels for goods
and labels for agents. We will refer to an agent with land holdings at distance r from the
core as Agent r. This agent will consume a set of goods labelled by z, and supply one of
these goods — their unique good labelled z = r —to the core.
When Agent r produces their unique good and brings it to the core it sells at price p(r).
Production of this good is subject to constant returns and, by choice of units, one for one
with the Watts collected at distance r. But there are transport costs to moving goods to
the core just as there was in the Only Energy Model. The quantity of good r delivered
to C by Agent r is ∆ − cr. Therefore, if Agent r chooses the agglomerate option, the
income they have available to spend at the core is equal to the value of goods they deliver:
p(r)(∆− cr). Agents have love-of-variety preferences defined over the set of available goods.
Let n represent the number (measure) of goods agents can potentially consume, then the
15 The option of agent’s consuming their own unique good rather than trading it for other goods in the
core will never be optimal unless goods are perfect substitutes.
16 Using distance as a metric for product differentiation has a very long and noble tradition in economics
going back at least to the work of Hotelling, Lancaster, and Salop.
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utility for an agent with holdings at distance r from the core is given by:
u(r) =
[∫ n
0
m(z, r)dz
]1/
where 0 <  < 1 (6)
where m(z, r) is the consumption of good z by agent r, and 1/ (1− ) > 1, is the elasticity
of substitution between varieties.
3.1 The Home Production Option
When agents rely on home production they choose the number of goods to produce to max-
imize their utility. Production features increasingly strong diseconomies when production
is spread across goods. To capture these diseconomies we introduce a function γ(n) which
is declining in n with 0 ≤ γ(n) ≤ 1. We set γ(0) = 1 and assume there exists a very large,
but finite, n+ such that γ(n+) = 0. These assumptions ensure no agent can be a jack-of-all
trades without significant productivity losses. Then letting s(z) be the share of each agent’s
energy endowment used in producing good z at home, we write the quantity of any good z
produced at home as γ(n)s(z)∆.
It is now simple to calculate utility under home production. We start by solving for utility
conditional on the number of goods produced. Since goods enter utility symmetrically, we
must have s(z) = 1/n when there are n goods produced. Since consumption must equal
home production it follows that m(z, r) = γ(n)∆/n for all z. Substituting into (6) and
simplifying, we find utility for an agent producing n goods at home, uH , is given by:
uH = n(1−)/γ(n)∆ (7)
There are two opposing forces determining an agent’s optimal n. Agents prefer to diversify
since utility is increasing in variety. This benefit of diversification is captured by the power
function of n in (7). Working against the benefits of diversification are its costs. These costs
as reflected in how γ, and hence productivity, falls and the marginal costs of diversification
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rise when agents produce many goods. Costs rise increasingly fast if γ′′(n) < 0. Both the
marginal costs and benefits of diversification are proportional to spatial productivity because
of our constant-returns-within-goods assumption. Under relatively weak assumptions an
optimal n∗ exists and is unique.17 At this maximum we can represent an agent’s utility
as uH(∆) ≡ [n∗](1−)/γ(n∗)∆. We note uH is not indexed by r because utility from home
production is independent of location, and n∗ is not a function of ∆ because of our constant
returns assumption.
3.2 The Agglomerate Option
We examine the agglomerate option in two steps. First, we solve for the utility level of a
typical Agent r who agglomerates in the core and has access to a given set of n goods. To
do so we construct a solution for the complete general equilibrium conditional on n. Second,
we find the set of conditions under which agents producing these n goods will agglomerate.
Since preferences are identical across agents, we know that for any two goods z and z′
sold in the core, consumption by any agent r must be such that
m(z, r)
m(z′, r)
=
[
p(z′)
p(z)
]1/(1−)
(8)
Budget balance for Agent r requires
[∫ n
0
p(z)m(z, r)dz
]
= I(r) where income is I(r) =
p(r)(∆−cr). Solving the agent’s consumption problem allows us to write the indirect utility
as:
U(r) = I(r)/P where P =
[∫ n
0
p(r)/(1−)dr
](1−)/
(9)
Market clearing requires demand equal to supply for every good. The aggregate supply
17The first order condition that maximizes (7) is ((1− )/)n−1 = −γ′(n)/γ(n). Any interior maximum is
unique because γ′(n) < 0. One useful parameterization of γ(n) is given by γ(n) = 1−d(n) where d(n) = d0nδ
with d0 > 0 and δ > 1. d(n) captures the increasingly large costs of any one individual diversifying their
production plans. It is now simple to show that a rise in diversification costs, d0 or δ, lowers the optimal n
∗
and lowers agent’s utility; that a maximal n+ exists; and that greater substitution across varieties leads to
agents’ diversifying less than otherwise.
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of good z is equal to the aggregate supply of all 2pir agents living at distance r = z with
each agent supplying (∆ − cr ) of the rth good. Aggregate supply is then given by X(z) =
2piz(∆− cz). Denote aggregate demand by all agents as M(z). Then, since preferences are
homothetic, market clearing requires for any two goods z and z′:
m(z, r)
m(z′, r)
=
M(z)
M(z′)
=
[
2pir(∆− cr)
2pir′(∆− cr′)
]
(10)
Using the solutions for relative supply from (10) in (9) for Agent r allows us to write the
maximized utility of a representative agent under the agglomerate option. Denoting this by
uA(r) we find maximized utility can be written as the product of three terms:
uA(r) = ∆
[
(1− (c/∆)r)
(r)1−
] [∫ n
0
[r′(1− (c/∆)r′)] dr′
] (1−)

(11)
The utility from agglomeration comes from three conceptually distinct sources: spatial
productivity, location, and city size. The first term in (11) shows utility rises proportionally
with the spatial productivity of available resources. The second term in (11) is Agent r
specific and tells us that agents closer to the core have higher real incomes and utility.
It is useful to note that for any given n we have uA(r) < uA(r′) if r′ < r. This second
term tells us that location matters. The third term reflects the benefit of greater choice in
larger agglomerations. This city size effect is common to all agents, and it tells us that a
ceteris paribus increase in n raises utility. Together, spatial productivity, location, and city
size determine the utility of any prospective Agent r. To solve for the general equilibrium
conditional on n, we note that with supplies given in (10), relative prices follow from Agent
r’s first order condition. Using the fact that spending must equal the value of each agent’s
delivered supplies, we have a complete solution to the general equilibrium.
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3.2.1 The Number of Goods
We start by noting the set of goods available in the city cannot include varieties that are
further than R∗ = ∆/c from the core. Energy constraints put a hard limit on maximum
city size since any good transported from a greater distance would have zero supply when
delivered. Goods produced at points interior to this distance do have strictly positive deliv-
ered supply and agents capable of producing those goods may choose to agglomerate. Since
we have already shown utility for any agent is decreasing in their distance from the core,
we only need to identify the set of agents who are just indifferent between the agglomerate
option and the home production option. By construction, such a marginal Agent r would
have holdings such that when r = n they are just indifferent between their two options. To
find these marginal agents we evaluate (11) at r = n to solve for their utility.
Perhaps surprisingly, we can now show using (11) evaluated at r = n that utility for a
marginal agent is hump shaped in n. Since this result is important we record it in a lemma.
Lemma 1 The utility enjoyed by a marginal agent under the agglomerate option starts at
zero when n = 0, rises to a single peak, and returns to zero when n = ∆/c.
Proof. See Appendix.
When the city (and hence n) is very small, transport costs are very close to zero. This
follows from the physics of the problem since costs are linear in distance. But a marginally
larger city provides a larger choice set and lower overall price index for consumption at al-
most identical costs. As a result, the utility of a marginal agglomerating agent initially rises
with city size. But as the city grows in size, marginal agents suffer larger transport costs and
face greater competition in product markets. Even though a now quite large city provides
tremendous variety in consumption, energy constraints soon dominate all other considera-
tions. The utility for a marginal agglomerating agent begins to fall and will eventually hit
zero.
With Lemma 1 in hand, we can now examine the marginal agent’s problem. We start by
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using a figure to sort out issues of multiple equilibria and stability, and then turn to algebra
to examine the determinants of agglomeration more closely. Figure 1 plots the utility of
“the marginal agent” under the two options in three different settings. The settings are
differentiated by the spatial productivity of the surrounding landscape with ∆L < ∆
cr < ∆H .
In each setting, the agent can decide to remain dispersed and engage in home production;
or, specialize, agglomerate, and trade. Utility under home production is a constant in this
figure and is the same for any potential marginal agent. Therefore, utility for any agent
under home production is proportional to ∆ and we can represent the utility levels achieved
in the three settings (low ∆L, critical ∆
cr, and high ∆H spatial productivity) by the height
of the three horizontal lines as shown. Under the agglomerate option, utility is a single
peaked function of the number of goods available in the core but shifts upward with spatial
productivity. Since the number of goods available in any core also measures core size, we
label the horizontal axis as agglomeration size. Correspondingly, the three hump shaped
curves represent utility for a marginal agglomerating agent in settings with low ∆L, critical
∆cr, and high ∆H spatial productivity.
Agglomeration Size
ΔL
c
Δcr
c
ΔH
c
n0 n1
ucrH
ncr
ΔL < Δ
cr < ΔH uHH
uLH
ucrA
uHA
uLA
Figure 1: Agglomeration
It is now simple to examine the agglomerate decision. Consider the first pair of ticked
curves associated with ∆L. In this situation, utility under home production lies everywhere
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above that for agglomeration. This implies home production dominates agglomeration for
any agglomerating agent. No agglomeration occurs. Next consider the second pair of dashed
curves associated with ∆cr. As shown, these two curves are just tangent at the point ncr.
Inspection of uA and uH reveals that uA responds more than proportionately with an increase
in spatial productivity. This implies any gap between these curves must shrink as spatial
productivity rises above ∆L. By continuity there must exist a critical value as shown and
labelled with cr for critical. Therefore, the agent who is at distance r = ncr from the
core would just be willing to agglomerate. Moreover, since Agent ncr is indifferent between
options, we know from (11) that agents located at r < ncr strictly prefer the agglomerate
option. Therefore, an agglomeration now forms when we raise the spatial productivity to
∆cr.
Finally consider the highest productivity setting with ∆H . There are now two intersection
points: one at n0 and the other at n1. Consider n0. At this point, the agent located at
distance r = n0 from the core would be indifferent between agglomerating or not. Again
since n0 is just a particular value for n, we know from (11) that all agents r < n0 would
necessarily choose to agglomerate. Therefore, n0 represents a possible core size with n0 as
the last agent to join the core. Now consider n1. The observations we just made apply
with equal force to this new marginal agent n1. Therefore n1 is also a possible core size
and it appears we have a situation of multiple equilibria. This is true, but only one of
these equilibria is robust to small perturbations. When the core size is n0 all agents in the
range between n1 and n0 enjoy the utility associated with home production. In contrast
if n1 was the core size, these same agents would enjoy utility strictly greater than home
production utility. Therefore, n0 is not robust to a small perturbations in the number of
agents agglomerating. In contrast, n1 is robust and we will for the remainder only consider
equilibria of this type in our analysis. Putting these results together, we have shown that
if the spatial productivity of energy resources is sufficiently high, ∆ ≥ ∆cr, agglomeration
occurs. If the spatial productivity of energy resources is sufficiently low, ∆ < ∆cr agents
22
remain dispersed in home production.
While these statements are true, a small bit of algebra allows us to go further and
discover an important result not apparent from the figure. The existence of an agglomeration
outcome requires a solution for n∗ that equates (11) evaluated at r = n with (7). Since
∆ cancels from both sides of this equality it is apparent that whether n∗ exists or not
depends only on the ratio ∆/c. Therefore, the decision to agglomerate depends on what
we may call “the comparative advantage of a location” as evidenced by the ratio of spatial
productivity to transport costs — ∆/c. Our previous graphical analysis now implies that
there exists a critical ∆/c which determines whether agents agglomerate or not. Locations
with ∆/c ≥ [∆/c]cr lead to agglomerations, those with ∆/c < [∆/c]cr do not.
This reliance on the comparative advantage of a location seems very natural. Transport
costs may for example be quite low in a desert or along the arctic tundra because elevation
changes are infrequent, but of course the productivity of these locations is also extremely
low. Therefore we would expect few if any settlements. In contrast, regions close to the
equator are very fertile which we would associate with a large spatial productivity ∆; but
these regions often feature inhospitable terrains suggesting higher transport costs as well.
Again, we may find few or no settlements despite very high spatial productivity. A region
with agglomeration need not have especially high productivity nor low transport costs; but
it does need to exhibit a locational comparative advantage (as measured by our theory).
Proposition 4 If the comparative advantage of a location is sufficiently high, ∆/c > (∆/c)cr,
then an agglomeration arises. (∆/c)cr is determined by the productivity costs of diversifica-
tion and agent’s love of variety.
Proof. In text.
Proposition 4 links agglomeration to key parameters of the model.
First, the stronger are the returns to specialization, the greater are the costs of diversifi-
cation as captured in γ(n), and the more likely is agglomeration. Relatedly, as goods become
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better substitutes (the degree of substitutability across goods is captured by σ = 1/[1− ])
agglomeration is less likely since agents can do without the variety benefits a city offers.
These results echo earlier work. Second, the likelihood of an agglomeration is dependent on
transport costs. Low transport costs, all else equal, raise the likelihood of agglomeration.
This is in stark contrast to a typical economic geography model where transport costs are
incurred by final goods trade rather than input supply. Lower final goods transport costs
typically make it less important to agglomerate; here lower costs raise the prices input sup-
pliers get for energy brought to the city which makes agglomeration more likely. Third,
agglomeration is dependent on a location’s comparative advantage ∆/c and this measure
surely varies widely within countries. This is also in contrast to typical economic geography
models where the degree of increasing returns or even transport costs themselves do not
vary within countries. Finally, absolute advantage as captured by ∆ is irrelevant to ag-
glomeration. More productive energy resources do not spur agglomeration unless they also
come with proportionately lower transport costs. To understand these and other empirical
implications of our theory we now turn to place them into the related empirical literature.
4 Empirical Implications
4.1 Lumpiness
Perhaps the most central fact of economic geography is that human settlements are unevenly
distributed across geographic space. For example, the G-ECON dataset built by Nordhaus
and coauthors (see Nordhaus (2006)) shows that fully 85% of the world’s GDP is produced
within 10% of the land area, and this lumpiness of people and production is a feature of all
countries. These statistics are constructed from recent data (1990s and later), but to the
extent that we can trust population estimates from earlier periods, lumpiness in economic
activity appears to be a feature of almost all known history.18
18 One formal measure of lumpiness is the Spatial Gini Coefficient which measures inequality in the
distribution of economic activity across geographic space. As with the typical Gini coefficient a measure
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Our theory produces lumpiness across geographic space very naturally, whereas other
approaches have real challenges confronting this fact. For example, most of urban economics
generate limits to city size via congestion costs and hence model distance and sometimes
geographic space within cities, but there is no sense of geographic space across or between
cities. Alternatively, models of economic geography almost always ignore geographic space
in theoretical representations. Typically, locations are fixed points interchangeably referred
to as cities, regions or countries. Our formulation in contrast has zero dimensional cities or
cores, but real geographic space around cores and by implication — since cities cannot reap
energy resources from the same area — between cities as well. As a result, lumpiness arises in
three different, but related ways. First, Proposition 4 identifies a critical value of comparative
advantage (∆/c)cr that divides locations into those which produce agglomeration and those
that do not. If we think natural advantages vary continuously across geographic space, then
smooth and continuous variation in natural conditions will result in a landscape punctuated
by agglomerations.
To visualize how variation in these natural attributes can create lumpiness across ge-
ographic space, consider the three panels of Figure 2 below. To construct the panels we
drew 100 ∆ and 100 c from uniform distributions. We then paired the draws, calculated the
ratio ∆/c, and associated them with specific squares in panel (a). If the square contains a
ratio sufficiently large to produce an agglomeration it is black, and by varying the minimum
ratio Proposition 4 tells us is necessary for agglomeration we can make the checkerboard
more black or more white.19 A simple measure for urbanization might be the fraction of
dark squares in panel (a). An increase in the cost of diversification, γ(n), for example,
would lower the necessary cut off while an increase in the absolute advantage of all locations
of zero implies an equal distribution whereas 1 represents completely unequal distribution. Again using the
G-ECON data, the Spatial Gini Coefficient for the world is 0.9 using GDP per unit area as the metric.
Country specific measures (from Ramacharan (2009) Table 1) are, for the US 0.83, for Canada 0.91, for
France 0.61, for Germany 0.57, and for the island country of Jamaica 0.32.
19 We picked the threshold using the empirical distribution of draws where ∆ is U(1, 2) and c is U(0, 1). The
threshold is simply the mean of (∆/c). Nothing important hinges on the choice since this is a visualization
and not a simulation.
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(holding comparative advantage constant), would have no effect on the pattern of agglomer-
ation. Such a change however makes the entire geographic space more productive and every
agglomerating agent richer, and therefore shows how the geographic pattern of settlement
should be independent of income levels.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 2: Agglomeration and Lumpiness Across Space
4.2 Populations
While it is tempting to take the fraction of black squares to be a very simple measure of
urbanization, this very simple depiction underestimates the extent of lumpiness across space
because it ignores population differences across agglomerations. To address this issue we
solve for equilibrium population sizes for each black square under two different assumptions
about how populations respond to agglomeration. To start we assume population growth or
migration is unaffected by the process of agglomeration, despite the fact that it raises real
incomes considerably. Using this assumption we start by recalling that our initial setting
was one with a uniform density of individuals across geographic space. Recall also that for
simplicity, we chose units so that one agent was resident on each one meter square of land,
Ω = 1. The first impact of agglomeration is then to concentrate these individuals in the core.
Its apparent then that population in any core will reflect the equilibrium n∗ as determined
by tastes, technologies and comparative advantage. If we focus on differences in population
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arising from variation in the productivity of nearby energy resources, we can prove:
Proposition 5 The population size of any agglomeration rises faster than the square of spa-
tial productivity.
Proof. See Appendix.
When spatial productivity rises, the utility benefits of agglomerating rise and this implies
core expansion. This core expansion is very similar to the expansion on the extensive margin
in the Only Energy Model, but here the impact of higher productivity is slightly stronger.
It is stronger (greater than power 2) because expansion brings a greater variety of products
to the core, and this makes agglomerating even more attractive and therefore cities larger.
Not surprisingly, as goods become better substitutes this variety effect diminishes, and in
the limit as  approaches 1 the response of population approaches the square of spatial
productivity. To visualize this extensive margin effect we have presented in the panel (b) of
Figure 2, but now the height of any black square is proportional to the square of comparative
advantage.20
Naturally, the distribution of population is much more extreme than the distribution
of black and white squares. There are still rural (white squares) and urban areas (black
squares), but urban areas now feature both big and small cities. Therefore, the second
way our theory generates lumpiness is by showing how city size should scale with spatial
productivity (for given transport costs). But even this second panel underestimates the
lumpiness we could expect under our theory. Recall that an increase in spatial productivity
creates both an extensive and intensive margin effect; therefore scalar increases in ∆ and c,
leave the extensive margin unaffected but generate more energy (and real income) for all city
residents. If we assume that population growth (or migration) expands to partially or fully
dissipate the real income gains brought by agglomeration, then city sizes will be affected by
this intensive margin affect. To see its full potential suppose Malthusian population growth is
20 To make these figures we have chosen to use the limiting case where  approaches one. As  approaches
one, n becomes proportionate to ∆/c implying that city population scales with the square of ∆ just as net
energy supply did in the Only Energy Model.
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operative (this is only one of several possible mechanisms). Recall the density of individuals
across the landscape was Ω = 1. If we take this existing density to represent a Malthusian
steady state prior to the agglomeration option, then uH/Ω = Z where Z is the real income per
agent that sets births equal to deaths, and uH is real income. When agents agglomerate and
a core forms, this creates large income gains for agents who are not marginal. If population
growth subsequently dissipates these gains, then the density of agents must adjust so that
agents r within the core would have a density satisfying ΩA = uA(r)/Z. And using (11), the
total core population becomes:
PopC =
2pi∆
Z
∫ n
0
r′Ω(r′)dr′ =
2pi∆
Z
[∫ n
0
[r′(1− (c/∆)r′)] dr′
]1/
(12)
and we have a further implication of our scaling law:
Proposition 6 If population growth (or migration) dissipates the real income gains from
agglomeration, then the population of any agglomeration rises faster than the cube of spatial
productivity ∆.
Proof. See Appendix.
This result can be visualized by inspecting panel (c) of Figure 2. In this panel popula-
tions are now proportional to the cube of the underlying spatial productivity, and as shown
the distribution of city sizes is now wider. Therefore, the third way our theory generates
lumpiness in economic activity across geographic space is by transforming variation in nat-
ural conditions into real income gains that are subsequently dissipated by further entry by
migrants or new births.
4.3 Persistence and Location
Two other key facts of economic geography are that agglomerations are almost always located
near discrete variations in the natural landscape such as valleys, rivers and coastlines; and
that agglomerations themselves are highly persistent. Empirically, the link with water access
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is especially well documented. For example, Rappaport and Sachs (2003) find that in the
year 2000 US coastal counties comprise 13% of the land mass, but 57% of economic income
and 51% of the population. Nordhaus (2006) also reports economic activity tightly tied to
water access. The key study with regard to persistence is Davis and Weinstein (2002). They
show that the geographic distribution of the Japanese population across 39 prefects has
been very stable for almost 8,000 years. The rank and raw correlations across these many
millennia often exceed 0.8. Moreover, they also show that a major shock to built up cities,
factories and populations, the Allied bombing of Japanese cities during WWII, had only
a temporary and not permanent effect on the distribution of Japanese population. Their
work suggests a strong degree of permanence in the geographic distribution of populations, at
least for Japan. While it appears that Japan may be somewhat special because of its interior
mountains and coastal nature, examples of persistence abound. For example, every one of
the world’s largest cities since 1000 AD would be well known to any well travelled individual
in the 21st century,21 and while substantial turnover in leading cities within countries does
occur (witness the fall of Detroit, Baltimore, Cleveland and St. Louis, and the rise of Atlanta,
Dallas, Houston and Miami in the U.S.) there is tremendous geographic persistence. In the
US for example, 16 of the 20 most populous cities in 2010, and 16 of 20 most populous in
1850 are all located on coasts or major waterways (the Great Lakes).22 Therefore, while
the fortune of individual cities has risen and fallen, the location of economic activity has
remained tightly tied to geographic advantage for literally thousands of years.
These features would be easily explained by our theory if the benefits of an unchang-
ing geography that lowered transport costs c(θ) led to agglomeration. While this seems a
reasonable conjecture, to prove it requires us to identify the set of marginal agglomerating
agents along the transport corridor and in the hinterland. Keeping track of all these agents
and considering their decisions to agglomerate or not requires significant work that we leave
21 If you have been to London, Istanbul, Beijing (Peking), New York and Tokyo you have been to all of
the world’s largest cities over this period.
22For example in 2010, of the top 20 largest US cities only Dallas, Phoenix, Minneapolis, and Denver are
not on coasts or the great lakes.
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to the Appendix. Here we just record the basic result:
Proposition 7 Consider a setting where agents are dispersed in home production because
agglomeration is not possible given existing conditions. If we introduce into this setting a
river, road, or natural transportation corridor offering a sufficiently large cost advantage,
then agents with access to the corridor will agglomerate along it.
Proof. See Appendix.
4.4 Adding up across geographic space and national populations
Finally, how do our predictions add up over space and populations to generate predictions
for larger regions or countries? While a complete analysis of this problem would surely
involve a discussion of the effects of population and economic growth, and perhaps even
historical accidents, we instead offer a simple, but useful means for understanding how the
main features of our theory provide the building blocks for such an analysis. To do so,
it proves useful to divide geographic space into uniform landscapes which are homogenous
geographic regions where all locations are equally attractive.23 Formally, a uniform landscape
is defined by a common set of our four model parameters plus an area A: that is, the set
(∆,∆/c, γ(n), , A). Apart from very small countries or islands, real countries are composed
of many such landscapes. We think of uniform landscapes as being populated with many
cores; and many (different) uniform landscapes comprising political units such as countries.
To make this idea concrete, we depict a set of four uniform landscapes in the top boxes of
Figure 3, and then combined bits and pieces of these landscapes in the four boxes on the
second row that define a hypothetical country. The uniform landscapes in the first row differ
only in their spatial productivity. Each step from right to left represents a doubling of the
landscape’s spatial productivity.
23In ongoing and related work, Food, Fuel and the Rise of Cities (Moreno-Cruz and Taylor, 2016), we
introduce a series of landscapes including those with rivers, coastlines etc. For brevity and simplicity we
discuss only uniform landscapes here.
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Figure 3: Cities and Regions
The fiction of uniform landscapes gives us a means to impose adding up constraints over
space to see what predictions these constraints, together with our earlier theory, provide
at the landscape and country level.24 To proceed recall that Proposition 5 tells us the
exploitation zone for any successful core expands at a rate greater than the square of spatial
productivity. Therefore, (using an approximate solution as  approaches 1 to simplify) we
show the rightmost square contains 64 cores, the next contains only 16, then 4 and then 1.
Core numbers fall with the square of spatial productivity. And from Proposition 6, we know
that if populations in these cores are responsive to the real income gains brought about by
their agglomeration, then the populations of these cores must rise at a rate greater than the
cube of spatial productivity. Therefore, city populations rise at least by a factor of 8 with
each step from right to left. If we now put these observations together, it implies that a
uniform landscape’s total population rises only proportionally with spatial productivity.25
Regions with more productive energy resources will exhibit fewer but bigger cities. If we look
across regions differentiated solely by productivity we see a world that looks very constant
returns because populations respond proportionately to productivity differences; but if we
compare individual cores within these regions we will see instead vast differences in core
sizes that are suggestive of increasing returns. All of these results are direct, but surprising
24It should be clear that in any model without explicit geographic space (where cores are points, and
cross-core links are lines) there can be no predictions arising from imposing space constraints.
25We are grateful to David Stern for pointing out this implication of our work in a slightly different context.
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implications of our scaling law that manifests itself differently at the core and region level.
While these are interesting (and perhaps to some readers, curious) implications of uniform
landscapes, few countries are well represented by a single uniform landscape. We imagine
instead that the data we obtain almost always comes from political units that look much
more like the four boxes shown in the second row. And if empirical researchers cannot
first identify and then condition on a landscape’s unique characteristics to neatly divide this
country back into uniform landscapes, is there anything our theory tells us about the likely
distribution of city sizes in this hypothetical country?
It should be clear that our theory — without further assumptions — does not constrain
the distribution of city sizes in any meaningful way. It does however present a simple means
for understanding how city size distributions may be linked to our theory’s primitives.
Τ𝑢𝐻 ∆
𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 ( Τ∆ 𝑐)𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒
𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑠𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑔(𝑁)
Τ(∆ 𝑐)𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡
𝑓( Τ∆ 𝑐)
𝑁 ∝ Τ(∆ 𝑐)2
Τ𝑢𝐴 ∆
45°
𝑁 ∝ Τ(∆3 𝑐2)
Figure 4: City Size Distribution
In Figure 4 we have constructed two potential city size distributions in quadrant II,
by combing elements of our theory with an assumed distribution of comparative advantage
(shown in quadrant IV). To construct the figure we assume agents everywhere have access
to the same technologies and they share the same tastes, but agents are situated at locations
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in our hypothetical country which may differ in their comparative, and absolute, advantage
as measured by ∆/c and ∆. To construct the city size distributions we start in quadrant
I. Using Proposition 4, we know there exists a single critical level of comparative advantage
determining whether agents agglomerate or not. If we then order our country’s potential
locations in terms of increasing comparative advantage along the horizontal axis, we can
represent the maximal utility a marginal agglomerating agent may achieve under any par-
ticular ∆/c by the increasing curve labelled uA/∆. This maximal utility is increasing in
∆/c and just equals that available under home production when agglomeration becomes the
chosen result. We have shown this by the intersection of the upward sloping line labelled
uA/∆ and the single horizontal line labelled uH/∆. uH/∆, given by (7), is a constant in this
figure because its maximized value is only a function of taste and technology parameters,
but not ∆ nor c. In contrast, uA/∆ is strictly increasing because the maximal values for
utility shown in Figure 1 move up and to the right with spatial productivity. Therefore, the
first quadrant shows how the agglomeration decision of many agents across a country are
resolved with agents at locations where ∆/c ≥ (∆/c)cr choosing agglomeration, and agents
at all other locations remaining dispersed in home production.
If we now follow the critical value (∆/c)cr, downward to quadrant IV, and reflect it by
use of a 45-degree line we find the portion of the distribution of comparative advantage in
this country, f(∆/c), that will be relevant to the city size distribution. We have shaded the
relevant portion of this distribution; for simplicity we have made no particular assumptions
about f(∆/c) other than it is symmetric, continuous, and positive. Locations with poor
values for comparative advantage become cities with probability zero; but for locations with
better fundamentals, a city will form. To find how frequent we might expect cities of a certain
type, we start by reading from f the relevant probability mass associated with any location’s
comparative advantage. Since agents’ agglomeration decision has effectively truncated f ,
we need to scale up the probability mass associated with a successful agglomeration by
1/[1 − F (∆/c)cr], where F is the cumulative distribution corresponding to f . Scaling up
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ensures that the eventual city size distributions shown in quadrant II integrate to one. With
this complication in hand, in quadrant III we map any given ∆/c into a city population
size. Then taking the (correctly scaled) probability mass associated with any given ∆/c
from quadrant IV, and associating it with the resulting city size in quadrant III, generates
the implied city size distributions shown in quadrant II. Repeating this exercise many times
traces out the complete distributions. As shown the distributions exhibit a minimum city
size, a long right tail, and are monotonically declining. Any resemblance to the Pareto family
of distributions is purely intentional.
To understand why we have two possible city size distributions we need to recall that both
comparative and absolute advantage matter: the first dictates whether we get agglomeration,
the second its population or income level. Therefore, our distribution f cannot, without
further assumption, completely determine the distribution of city sizes. Two limiting cases
are instructive, and these lead to the two city size distributions shown. Suppose first that
absolute advantage (spatial productivity) was the same across all locations, so that f(∆/c)
reflected only variation in transport costs. By construction then, the correlation between
absolute and comparative advantage across locations is zero; and, any two cities differ only
in comparative advantage. The city size distribution would be that given by the lower
curve in quadrant II where population sizes are approximately proportional to the square of
comparative advantage. This result is very similar to Proposition 5.
In contrast, suppose transport costs were the same across all locations and only variation
in ∆ was captured in f . Now locations differ in both absolute and comparative advantage and
these measures are now perfectly positive correlated. In this case, the city size distribution
is given by the uppermost curve in the figure. Populations are responding across cities due
to both changes in the extensive (comparative advantage) and intensive margin (absolute
advantage) as in Proposition 6. In reality we expect the correlation between comparative
and absolute advantage to be positive but less than perfect, and in this case our two city
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size distributions are bounds on all others.26
Although this construction is somewhat lengthy it is productive in showing how our
theory’s agglomeration decision (Proposition 4), and scaling relationships (Propositions 5
and 6), together with further assumptions, generate an equilibrium city size distribution.
Several features of this construction are noteworthy. One robust feature of the construction is
the truncation of the city size distribution so there are no very small cities. The extent of this
truncation depends on the solution to the optimization problem in quadrant I; for example, if
goods were better substitutes or if diversification less costly, then home production becomes
more attractive and minimum city size grows. Another robust feature is that the scaling
relationships created by the spatial structure of our model lengthens the tail of the city size
distribution. Here again we find our scaling law shapes outcomes in somewhat surprising
ways.
What is not robust is that the city size distributions as shown are falling throughout
but they could at first rise steeply and then only fall with larger city sizes. Since empirical
research often focuses on larger cities, this seems inconsequential. We have also implicitly
assumed agents outside option is to remain dispersed in home production rather than move
across cores. This seems like a natural first step since resources are often immobile, and
we have a one factor model. Despite these limitations, the figure usefully summarizes how
our theory, together with additional assumptions on the distribution of energy resources
over space, can generate a city size distribution very much like that found in the empirical
literature studying Zipf’s law.
5 Conclusions
We set out a simple spatial model in order to ask how the location and productivity of
energy resources affects the distribution of economic activity around the globe. Our ma-
26If negatively correlated, then the city size distribution features an even longer right tail and remains
truncated.
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jor contribution is the introduction of a new approach to explaining the world’s economic
geography by focussing on the supply conditions for one, critical, and essential, input — en-
ergy. We found that adopting an explicitly spatial setting implied a scaling law linking the
(spatial) productivity of energy resources to potential energy deliveries at any point. Even
small differences in their spatial productivity produced large differences in available energy
at any location. We then embedded this simple model of energy supply into a conventional
market model where differentiated products, a return to specialized production, and a need
for energy in production drove a desire to agglomerate.
Combining elements from economic geography and energy economics proved quite fruit-
ful. We showed how the geographic pattern of agglomeration is driven by a location’s com-
parative advantage, and when the comparative advantage of a location is sufficiently high,
agents concentrate in our core, specialize, trade, and reap large income gains from doing
so. This implies that geographic variation in our model’s measure of comparative advan-
tage, produces lumpiness in the geographic location of economic activity. When a region
can support agglomeration, we found that the size of agglomerations scaled with the pro-
ductivity of nearby energy resources. This scaling of populations then implies still greater
lumpiness in the geographic location of production. And we showed how geographically
unique locations, such as river and coastal locations not only provide extremely persistent
motives for agglomeration, but by virtue of our scaling law they also generate extremely
large agglomerations.
Finally we showed how our model of a single core could add up to provide predictions
at a (homogenous) regional or (many region) national level. Richer regions feature larger
cities, higher population densities, and higher income agents. Although city sizes scale
with the cube of energy productivity, a region’s overall income or population responds only
proportionately. Most real geographic space is of course comprised of many locations that
differ quite markedly. And in a geographic space containing many such locations, we showed
how variation in comparative advantage together with our scaling law provides a simple
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theory of city size distributions. The distribution is truncated with no very small cities;
it has a long right tail with few very large cities; and its exact distribution flows from the
interplay of nature’s distribution of comparative advantage across geographic space and our
model’s generated scaling law relationships.
6 References
Allen, Robert C. 2009. “The British Industrial Revolution in Global Perspective.” UK:
Cambridge University Press
Brock, William, Gustav Engstromy and Anastasios Xepapadeas 2012. “Energy
Balance Climate Models and the Spatial Structure of Optimal Mitigation Policies” Mimeo
Brock, William, Anastasios Xepapadeas and Athanasios Yannacopoulos 2014.
“Optimal Control in Space and Time and the Management of Environmental Resources”
Working Paper Series Athens University of Economics and Business.
Chakravorty, U., J. Roumasset, and K. Tse. 1997. “Endogenous substitution among
energy resources and global warming.” Journal of Political Economy, 195: 1201-1234.
Davis, D. and D. Weinstein. 2002. “Bombs, bones and break points: the geography of
economic activity”, American Economic Review, 92 (5): 1269-1289
Decker EH, Kerkhoff AJ, Moses ME U. 2007. “Global Patterns of City Size Distribu-
tions and Their Fundamental Drivers”. PLoS ONE 2(9): e934. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000934
Desmet, Klaus, D. K. Nagy, and E. Rossi-Hansberg 2015 “The geography of develop-
ment: evaluating migration restrictions and coastal flooding,” National Bureau of Economic
Research w21087.
Fernihough, A. and K.H. O’Rourke. 2014. ”Coal and the European Industrial Revo-
lution”, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 19802j.
Fouquet, R. and R. Pearson. 1998. “A Thousand Years of Energy Use in the United
Kingdom.” The Energy Journal, 19(4): 1-41.
37
Gaudet, G., M. Moreaux, and S.W. Salant. 2001. “Intertemporal Depletion of Re-
source Sites by Spatially Distributed Users.” American Economic Review, 91(4): 1149-1159.
Head, Keith and Thierry Mayer 2004. “The Empirics of Agglomeration and Trade”
Chapter 59 in Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, Volume 4 edited by J.V. Hen-
derson and J.F. Thisse, Elsevier B.V.
Helpman, E. 1995. “The Size of Regions.” The Foerder Institute for Economic Research
Working Paper #14-95.
Krugman, P. 1991. “Increasing Returns and Economic Geography.” The Journal of Po-
litical Economy,, 99 (3):483-499.
Kolstad, C.D. 1994. “Hotelling Rents in Hotelling Space: Product Differentiation in
Exhaustible Resource Markets.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,
26: 163-180.
Laffont, Jean-Jacques and Moreaux, Michel. 1986. “Bordeaux Contre Gravier: Une
Analyse par les Anticipations Rationnelles,” in Gerard Gaudet and Pierre Lasserre, eds.,
Ressources naturelles et theorie economique. Quebec: Presses de l’Universite Laval, 1986,
pp. 231- 53.
Moreno-Cruz, J. and M.S. Taylor. 2012. “Back to the Future of Green Powered
Economies,” The National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No: 18236.
Nordhaus, W. D. 2006. ”Geography and Macroeconomics: New Data and New Findings,”
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (US), 103(10): 3510-3517.
Nunn, N. and N. Qian. 2011. “The Potato’s contribution to population and urbanization:
evidence from a historical experiment.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126, 593-650.
Pindyck, R.S. 1978. “The Optimal Exploration and Production of Nonrenewable Re-
sources.” Journal of Political Economy, 86(5): 841-861.
Ramcharan, R 2009. “Why an Economic Core: Domestic Transport Costs.” Journal of
Economic Geography, 9(4): 559-581
Rappaport, J and JD Sachs 2003. “The United States as a Coastal Nation.” Journal of
38
Economic Growth, 8(1): 5-46
Rosenthal, Stuart, S and William C. Strange 2004. “Evidence on the Nature and
Sources of Agglomeration Economies” Chapter 49 in Handbook of Regional and Urban Eco-
nomics, Volume 4 edited by J.V. Henderson and J.F. Thisse, Elsevier B.V.
Severnini, E.R. ”The Power of Hydroelectric Dams: Agglomeration Spillovers”, IZA Dis-
cussion Paper No. 8082..
Sanchirico, J.N. and J.E. Wilen. 1999.“Bioeconomics of Spatial Exploitation in a Patchy
Environment.”Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 37:129-150.
Smil, V. 2008. Energy in Nature and Society: General Energetics of Complex Systems.
USA: MIT Press.
Swierzbinski, J.E. and Mendelsohn, R. 1989. “Exploration and Exhaustible Resources:
The Microfoundations of Aggregate Models.” International Economic Review, 30(1): 175-
186.
Wrigley, E.A. 2010. Energy and the English Industrial Revolution. Cambridge University
Press. Cambridge, UK.
Zeeuw, J.W. 1978. “Peat and the Dutch Golden Age: the Historic meaning of energy
attainability”, in Afdeling Agrarische Geschiedenis Landbouwhogeschool, The Netherlands.
39
Appendix
A Proofs to Propositions
A.1 Proof to Proposition 1:
If transportation costs vary with the direction θ, then we can identify the maximum radius
in each direction θ as R(θ) = ∆
c(θ)
. To show that gross power is homogeneous of degree 3 we
calculate the following integral:
W ∗ =
∫ 2pi
0
∫ R(θ)
0
r∆drdθ =
∆3
2
∫ 2pi
0
1
c(θ)2
dθ (A.1)
which shows that for any function c(θ) gross power is a function homogeneous of degree 3 in
power density. To show the same is true for power supplied, we have:
W S =
∫ 2pi
0
∫ R(θ)
0
r(∆− c(θ)r)drdθ = ∆
3
6
∫ 2pi
0
1
c(θ)2
dθ
This shows power supplied W S is homogeneous of degree three in power density, but the
precise shape of the exploitation zone is determined by the form of c(θ).
A.2 Proof to Proposition 3:
Assume all roads have the same coefficient of friction ρc with 0 < ρ < 1. Optimal deployment
of the road system requires that roads are built to maximize coverage. That is, roads will
split the space in equal parts. The first road, as we have assumed, would split the space in
pi radians, then second road would split it in pi/2 radians, the third road in pi/4 radians, and
so on. Let n denote the number of roads. For given ρ, if n < n¯ where n¯ ≡ pi
2 arccos(ρ)
then the
exploitation zones added by each road do not overlap. If n > n¯ the exploitation zones will
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overlap. For n < n¯ we have:
W S = 4×
[
n
[∫ θ¯
0
∫ r∗
0
v (∆− c(θ)v) dvdθ +
∫ pi/2n
θ¯
∫ r∗
0
v (∆− cv) dvdθ
]]
where we have exploited symmetry in the first quadrant of the cartesian space. The integral
is then given by:
W S =
1
3
∆3
c2
g(ρ, n), where g(ρ, n) = pi + 2n(tan(θ¯)− θ¯)
It is easy to see now that power supplied is linear in the number of roads, n. For n > n¯, the
exploitation zones will intersect at odd multiples of pi/2n. The expression for power supplied
is now given by:
W S = 4×
[
n
[∫ pi
2n
0
∫ r∗
0
v (∆− c(θ)v) dvdθ
]]
W S =
1
3
∆3
c2
g(ρ, n), where g(ρ, n) = 2n
∫ pi
2n
0
(
(1− ρ2)1/2 sin θ + ρ cos θ)−2 dθ
To show that power supplied is increasing and concave in the number of transportation
options when n > n¯ we take derivatives with respect to n and show
∂WS
∂n
= 2
3
∆3
c2
[
g(ρ,n)
2n
− pi
2n
(
(1− ρ2)1/2 sin pi
2n
+ ρ cos pi
2n
)−2]
> 0 and
∂2WS
∂n2
=
−∆3pi2
(√
1−ρ2 cos ( pi2n)−ρ sin ( pi2n)
)
3c2n3
(√
1−ρ2 sin ( pi2n)+ρ cos ( pi2n)
)3 which is negative when √1− ρ2 cos ( pi2n)−ρ sin ( pi2n) > 0
or n > pi
2 arccos(ρ)
= n¯.
A.3 Proof to Lemma 1:
There are three elements to this proof. First, we need to show that uA at n = 0 is zero.
Second, we need to show that uA at n = ∆/c is zero. Third, we need to show there is a
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single peak. We proceed in order. Define the utility in agglomeration as:
uA(n,∆) = ∆f(n,∆)g(n,∆), where (A.2)
f(n,∆) =
(1− cn
∆
)
n(1−)
and g(n,∆) =
((
∆
c
)1+
B cn
∆
(1 + , 1 + )
) 1−

with Bcn/∆(1 + , 1 + ) =
∫ cn/∆
0
t(1− t)dt.
Both the denominator and the numerator approach zero as n approaches zero. Applying
l’Hospital rule we find
lim
n→0
(1− cn
∆
)
((
∆
c
)1+
B cn
∆
) 1−

(
− c
∆
(1− cn
∆
)−1 + (1−)

((
∆
c
)1+
B cn
∆
)−1 ∂Bcn/∆
∂n
)
n−
= 0
To show that limn→(∆/c) uA(n,∆) = 0 we can simply replace n = ∆/c to find the result. The
numerator is zero and the denominator is a real number.
Next, we show there is a single peak. A maximum is found at a point where ∂uA/∂n =
0. Taking derivatives and setting them equal to zero we find the maximum occurs where
−εfn = εgn where
εfn =
fnn
f
= −(1− )− cn
∆− cn < 0 and εgn =
gnn
g
=
1− 

(
cn
∆
)+1 (
1− cn
∆
)
B cn
∆
(1 + , 1 + )
> 0 (A.3)
It can be shown that
∂εfn
∂n
< 0 and ∂εgn
∂n
< 0. Moreover, εfn|n=0 = −(1− ) and εgn|n=0 =
(1−)/. So −εfn starts at a number (1−) > 0 and increases monotonically in n , while εgn
starts at (1− )/ < 1−  and decreases monotonically in n. The combination of continuity
and the intermediate value theorem show a crossing exists and it is unique. Thus, uA is
characterized by a single peak.
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A.4 Proof to Proposition 5:
Define the utility in home production as evaluated at the optimal number of goods as:
uH(∆) = K∆ In equilibrium we require uA = uH where uA is defined in equation (A.2).
There are two possible equilibria, but we have shown in the text that the only logical equi-
librium is the one to the right of the peak of uA. To see how the equilibrium number of
products moves with n we take total derivatives in both sides of the equilibrium equation to
find:
(fg + ∆f∆g + ∆fg∆)d∆ + ∆(fng + fgn)dn = Kd∆ (A.4)
(1 + εf∆ + εg∆)
d∆
∆
+ (εfn + εgn)
dn
n
=
d∆
∆
(A.5)
where
εf∆ ≡ f∆∆
f
=
cn
∆− cn > 0 and εg∆ ≡
g∆∆
g
=
(1− )(1 + )

−1− 

(
cn
∆
)+1 (
1− cn
∆
)
B cn
∆
(1 + , 1 + )
> 0
(A.6)
and εfn , εgn are given in equation (A.3). From equation (A.5) we find the elasticity of n
with respect to ∆ is given by:
dn
d∆
∆
n
= −εf∆ + εg∆
εfn + εgn
(A.7)
Detailed observation of the definitions of the different elasticities allows us to write the
following expressions εfn = −(1− )− εf∆ and εgn = (1−)(1+) − εg∆. We can replace these
expressions back in equation (A.7) to find
εn∆ ≡ dn
d∆
∆
n
=
(εfn + εgn)− (1−)
(εfn + εgn)
> 1 (A.8)
The inequality follows from recognizing that the equilibrium of interest is to the right of the
hump, which implies −εfn > εgn so both the denominator and the numerator are negative
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numbers, but the numerator is a larger number, in absolute value, than the denominator.
If population increases proportionately with the area of agglomeration, the radius of the
agglomeration is here determined by the marginal agent located at a distance r = n and
total population is Pop = pin2. Then, by increasing ∆ the area increases in proportion to
r2 and r increases more than proportionately with ∆. So population increases more than
proportionately with the square of ∆. Also notice, as discussed in the main text, that as 
approaches 1, the change in population is proportional to the square of the change in ∆.
A.5 Proof to Proposition 6:
Using the notation introduced above, we can write equation (12) as PopC = 2pi
Z
∆g(n,∆)
1
1−
To find the change in population due to a change in power density ∆, we use simple hat
algebra to find: dPop
C
d∆
∆
PopC
= 1+ 1
1− [gnn∆ + g∆] = 2+
1

fn
fn+gn
To show population changes
more than with the cube of power density we need to show that
dPopC
d∆
∆
PopC
− 3 > 0⇒ εfn
εfn + εgn
> 
Because the equilibrium is to the right of the hump, again we know fn > −gn so the left
hand side of the previous equation is always greater or equal to 1, it is equal to one only
when n = ∆/c or when  = 1. In the case of  = 1 we find dPop
C
d∆
∆
PopC
= 3.
A.6 Proof to Proposition 7:
Define rA as the distance at which agents are indifferent between bringing their energy to the
core, that is uA = uH , and also indifferent between doing this by land or taking advantage
of the road, that is θ = θ¯. Now, define rB as the distance of the agent that lives on the
low cost alternative, (θ = 0), and choses to go to the core. Every other agent at distances r
between rA and rB will go to the core only if they are an angle θ < θr from the horizontal,
where θr is yet to be defined. We observe that all agents along the city border have the same
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utility uA = uH . Given UA = I/P and P is the same for all agents, then it must be true
that income I is also the same for all agents on the city border. Specifically, all agents have
the same income as the agent at distance rA and angle θ¯. From these observations we can
identify θr, as the solution to the following implicit function:
p(rA)(∆− crA) = p(r)[∆− c(θ)r] (A.9)
where c(θ) is given by (4). We next need to find an expression for p(rA)
p(r)
. Recall that
m(rA)
m(r)
=
M(rA)
M(r)
=
X(rA)
X(r)
=
∫ θ¯
0
rA(∆− crA)dθ∫ θr
0
r(∆− c(θ)r)dθ
(A.10)
From the first order conditions of the utility maximization problem we find m(rA)
m(r)
=
(
p(r)
p(rA)
) 1
1−
and we combine these expressions to get
(∫ θr
0
r(∆− c(θ)r)dθ
)1−
[∆− c(θ)r] =
(∫ θ¯
0
rA(∆− crA)dθ
)1−
[∆− crA] (A.11)
where we can find θr as a function of r. We next use the implicit function theorem to find
whether dθr/dr < 0. To begin, we can see the righthand side of the previous equation is
independent of θr and r. So we can write the previous equation as
(∫ θr
0
r(∆− c(θ)r)dθ
)1−
= K(rA)×m(θ, r) (A.12)
Total derivation of the expression above yields:
dθr
dr
= −
(1− )
[∫ θr
0
∆− 2c(θ)dθ
]
(∆− c(θr)r) +
[∫ θr
0
r(∆− c(θ)r)dθ
]
c(θr)
(1− )r(∆− c(θr)r)2 −
[∫ θr
0
r(∆− c(θ)r)dθ
]
c′(θr)
(A.13)
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From the definition of c(θ) we have c′(θr) < 0, so that dθrdr < 0. Next, we need to characterize
θr as a function of ρ. When ρ falls, the distance rA increases. Because rA increases, and
rA = ρrB, then the energy margin expands and θr increases for each r. Now that we have
characterized θr, we can next calculate the supply of all goods that are a distance r < rB.
For r < rA, the supply of good r brought to the core is given by:
Xr(r < rA) = 4×
[∫ θ¯
0
r(∆− h(θ, ρ)cr)dθ +
∫ pi/2
θ¯
r(∆− cr)dθ
]
= 2pir[∆− l(ρ)cr] (A.14)
where l(ρ) = 1 − 2
pi
(θ¯ − (1 − ρ2)1/2). With these results in mind, it is straight forward to
show that supply increases as ρ decreases. Now, for rA < r < rB we find
Xr(rA < r < rB) = 4×
[∫ θr
0
r(∆− c(θ)r)dθ
]
(A.15)
= 4r
(
∆θr + ((1− ρ2)1/2(cos(θr)− 1)− ρ sin(θr))cr
)
(A.16)
= 4r (∆θr + v(ρ, θr)cr) (A.17)
where v(ρ, θr) = ((1− ρ2)1/2(cos(θr)− 1)− ρ sin(θr)). Next we can calculate the utility from
agglomeration.
The price index is given by:
P =
[∫ n
0
p(r)

−1dr
] 1−

=
[∫ rA(n)
0
p(r)

−1dr +
∫ n
rA(n)
p(r)

−1dr
] 1−

(A.18)
= p(r′)
[∫ rA(n)
0
[
r(∆− l(ρ)cr)
r′(∆− l(ρ)cr′)
]
dr +
∫ n
rA(n)
[ 2
pi
r (∆θr + v(ρ, θr)cr)
r′(∆− l(ρ)cr′)
]
dr
] 1−

(A.19)
and the utility from agglomeration is
U(r′, θ) =
(∆− l(ρ)cr′)
(r′)1−
[∫ rA(n)
0
[r(∆− l(ρ)cr)] dr +
∫ n
rA(n)
[
2
pi
r (∆θr + v(ρ, θr)cr)
]
dr
] −1

(A.20)
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The expression above has the exact same form as the expression we identified before in
the case without reduced costs transportation options. Set r′ equal to n and rA(n) = n/ρ ,
then we recover the same expression as before where uA = ∆f˜ × g˜ , where
f˜ =
(1− l(ρ)(c/∆)r′)
(r′)1−
(A.21)
and
g˜ =
[∫ rA(n)
0
[r(1− l(ρ)(c/∆)r)] dr +
∫ n
rA(n)
[
2
pi
r (θr + v(ρ, θr)(c/∆)r)
]
dr
] 1−

(A.22)
To complete the proof, we need to show that n increases with better transportation options.
To accomplish this, we need to find how n changes with ρ. Taking total derivatives of
the expression for utility agglomeration and recognizing that utility from staying home is
independent of the river option, we find
ρdn
ndρ
= −
f˜ρρ
f˜
+ g˜ρρ
g˜
f˜nn
f˜
+ g˜nn
g˜
> 0 (A.23)
where the inequality follows from observing that
f˜ρρ
f˜
= − (c/∆)nρl
′(ρ)
1− (c/∆)nl(ρ) > 0 (A.24)
and
g˜ρρ
g˜
=
−(1− )(+ 1)
(
ρl′(ρ)− (ρl
′(ρ)+l(ρ))(1− cnρl(ρ)∆ )

2F1(−,+1;+2; cnρl(ρ)∆ )
)
l(ρ)
> 0 (A.25)
where 2F1 is the Gauss hypergeometric function. As we showed before, the inequality follows
from recognizing that the equilibrium of interest is to the right of the hump, which implies
f˜nn
f˜
< − g˜nn
g˜
so the denominator is a negative.
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B Unit Costs of Electricity Transmission
Electric power measured in Watts is equal to the product of voltage and current: W = V I
where V is voltage measured in Volts and I is current measured in Amperes. Volts times
Amperes is Watts and since the power flowing from any energy resource will be measured in
Watts we need to write line losses in these terms to find net power available for delivery to
the core.
When electricity is transmitted over any distance, the transmission line heats up as power
is lost to heat because of the line’s resistance (Joule heating). Resistance is in turn related to
the size, material and length of the line. Very simply resistance is given by R = (ϕ/a)l where
ϕ is a measure of the resistivity of the material used in the cable, a is the cross-sectional
area of the cable and l is its length. Therefore, losses due to resistance are simply linear
in distance much as frictional losses were linear in distance. To find the extent of losses as
a function of distance, we need to transform line resistance (which is measured in Ohms)
into Watts. To do so, we use another well known result from physics: Ohm’s law. This
law states that the current transmitted along a linear conductor is proportional to voltage
and inversely proportional to the resistance; that is, I = V/R. Using this law we can now
calculate the power dissipated by resistance. Denote the line losses from transmission by
WL. These losses can then be related to the voltage and amperage relevant to our line as
given by WL = V I. Now using Ohm’s law we can substitute out voltage ( V = IR) to find
line losses WL are proportional to both resistance and the square of current since WL = I2R.
Replacing the expression for resistance we have WL = I2(ϕ/a)l = cl; where c = I2(ϕ/a).
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